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IF, S INCE A N D  BECAUSE: A  S TUDY  I N  CONDITIONAL
CONNECTION
Storrs  M CCA L L
Thirty years ago Gilbert Ryle published a  paper entitled " I f ' ,
"So", and "Because" (Ryle 119501) in which with great sensitivity he
investigates the logical powers and limitations of these words. " I f '
provides us with an inference-ticket, "because" puts the inference-
ticket to work in one way, " so "  (which stands apart from the other
two in signalling an argument) in another. Our concern here will be not
so much with " so "  but with "since", which 1 shall argue indicates a
connection between antecedent and consequent in "since p, q" that is
lacking in many uses of " if" .  With the help of "since" and "because"
I shall single out a distinctive reading of " i f '  which does reflect such a
connection, for which the task of the paper will be to provide precise
truth-conditions.
My point of departure will be the truth-conditions for " i f '  found in
Stalnaker [19681. Consider the conditional :
(1) I f  the Polish government fails to crush Solidarity, labour unrest
will spread to the Soviet Union.
How would you decide whether to accept (1) as true ? Stalnaker's
suggested procedure is as follows. Add the antecedent hypothetically
to your stock of beliefs, make whatever adjustments reason demands,
and ask whether you then believe the consequent. As Stalnaker points
out, there are two cases. I f  you believe that a causal or some other
kind o f  connection exists between antecedent and consequent, you
will accept the consequent. I f  on the other hand you do not believe
that such a connection exists, but believe the consequent on other
grounds (say on grounds that labour unrest is inevitable in repressive
regimes) then again you will accept the consequent. In either case, by
Stalnaker's semantics, you accept the entire conditional (1) as true.
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These semantics have the virtue of making causal or other connec-
tions between antecedent and consequent relevant when they are
relevant, but at the same time allowing conditionals to be true on other
grounds when they are absent.
Stalnaker's semantics, which allow fo r "connection" but fail to
treat it  as essential, provide an analysis o f  the conditional which
admits of wide application and which has met with wide acceptance. It
is certainly an advantage to be able to regard " i f "  as univocal, and to
produce a single set of truth-conditions which work for all or almost
all cases. But doubts remain about whether " if "  really is univocal (see
Aune [19671 for various kinds of " if " ),  and about whether in imposing
a single set of truth-conditions we may not be forcing conditionals into
a mould that fits some but not all. For example, suppose the present
configuration of the solar system makes it inevitable that the earth will
collide with a comet in 1997. Then Stalnaker's semantics verify the
conditional :
(2) I f  the US does not renounce the use of nuclear weapons, the
earth will be struck by a comet in 1997.
Yet it is doubtful that many would accept (2) as true, much less as a
persuasive reason f o r  nuclear disarmament. L a ck o f  connection
between antecedent and consequent would normally be given as the
explanation, even though the consequent were accepted as true. For
this reason it seems preferable to attempt to. provide se p a l
-
a te  t r u t h -
conditions fo r a stricter variety o f  conditional which requires the
presence of such a connection, the conditional in question coming out
false if  the connection is lacking. (
1
)
A connection of this kind between antecedent and consequent can






































































quent have a venerable history. Sextus Empiricus, reporting the debate on the nature of
conditionals in the fourth century BC. "when even the crows on the rooftops croaked
about which conditionals were true", mentions one of four rival schools of thought as
"introducing the notion of  connection." See W. and M. Kneale 119621 p. 129. More
recently, the idea of connection is discussed in Pollock 119751 and (19761. and in Nute
119801. Pollock. however, does not provide connexive or "necessitation" conditionals
with semantics built up from scratch, but defines them in terms of a basic Stalnaker-type
conditional which is neutral with respect to connection.
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possible world semantics for subjunctive and counterfactual conditio-
nals developed by Stalnaker and Lewis. (
2
) B r i e f l y ,  
b r a n c h e d  
p o s s i b l e
world model structures are tree-like continua, branching towards the
future, each branch o f  which is a complete four-dimensional "h is-
tory" of events. A branch point occurs at every moment in time when
two r more sets of events ar  each physically possible relative to an
earlier set of events. The actual history of the world is one branch of
the tree, complete up to the present, but nothing dictates which of the
many future branches will become actual. The structure is indetermi-
nistic because if  determinism were true, only one set of events would
be physically possible relative to each momentary state of affairs, and
the tree would consist o f  only one branch. A s we shall see, the
semantics fo r connexive conditionals require many branches, the
connection between antecedent and consequent being dependent on
how the branches are arranged.
As an example take Strawson's counterfactual :
(3) I f  the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have
won the war.
To determine whether (3) is true, we follow Stalnaker's and Lewis'
instructions and examine those possible worlds in which the antece-
dent is true but which in other respects most closely resemble the
actual world. In the branched course-of-events semantics we examine
those worlds which branch off from the actual world in 1940, or as
close as possible to 1940. The reason why we do not consider worlds
which branch off earlier, say in the 1920's and 30's when Churchill
was urging military preparedness, is that in some o f  these worlds
Britain's armed strength would doubtless here been greater than it
actually was in 1940 these considerations are irrelevant to the truth or
falsehood of (3). At the same time, we cannot consider histories in
which there is a discontinuity with the actual world, and in which
Germany miraculously assembles an invasion armada overnight. The
transition must in all cases be smooth and lawlike (at least within the
bounds of physical possibility), which of course gives Britain a certain
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truth o f  (3). In  the branched worlds semantics the rather flexible
notion o f  possible world similarity, purposely left vague in  Lewis
[1973], is replaced by the more precise notion o f  the amount o f
common past that two branchin2 worlds share.
A counterfactual A D—B, then, is non-vacuously true if  and only if
in the following diagram every closest A-world is a B-world : (
3
)
The truth-conditions can also be stated in this way: some A &  B-world
is closer to the actual world than any A & —B-world (Pollock 11976j,
p. 19 ; cf. Lewis [1973 p. 16). What is important here is the location of
the A  & —B-worlds which falsify the conditional. The key to  the
notion o f  "connection" which we are trying to capture lies in the
requirement that they must in  a ll cases fa ll outside the set o f
A &B-worlds, —A & —B-worlds, and possibly also —A &B-worlds,
centred on the actual world.
Can there be true counterfactuals the time of whose antecedents is
later than that of their consequents? There seems no reason why not.
In order to fly to London, one must leave Montreal the previous night.
Hence the following conditionals hold :
(4) I f  Alex had not left Montreal Tuesday night, he would not have
arrived in London Wednesday morning;
(5) I f  Alex had arrived in London Wednesday morning, he would






































































open set of closer and closer worlds but no closest. In addition, at least one A & B-world
must exist. A i s  vacuously true in Lewis' and Stalnaker's semantics if there are no
A-worlds.
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Let us call (4) a "forward counterfactual", and (5) a "backward
counterfactual". Plainly there are many true backward counterfac-
tuals, which are characterized by a syntactic peculiarity noted by
Lewis (1979), P. 458. I t  would be possible to replace the words "he
would have had to leave" in (5) by "he would have left", although the
result would be less idiomatic. This modalization of the consequent of
backward conditionals is part o f  standard usage, although its un-
derlying rationalization is unclear. (
4
)
What truth-conditions are appropriate fo r backward counterfac-
tuals? Essentially the same as for forward ones. The counterfactual
A 111-q3 is non-vacuously true if f  every closest A-world is a B-world.
This holds whether the time of A is earlier than, later than or the same
as the time of B. The conditional (5) above will be true if every closest
branch on which Alex arrives in London Wednesday morning is a
branch on which he leaves Montreal Tuesday night. The truth-condi-
tions for backward counterfactuals are thus no different from those for
forward ones.
Counterfactual conditionals are those in which both antecedent and
consequent are false. I f  antecedent and consequent are both true, the
result is what Goodman 119551, P. 4 calls a " factual"  conditional.
Such conditionals are expressed with greater felicity using "since"
rather than " i f "  :
(6) I f  the butter had been heated to 150°F, it would have melted ;
(7) Since the butter didn't melt, it  wasn't heated (couldn't have
been heated) to 150°F.
In this case, (7) is a backward factual, but forward factuals are just as
common :
(8) Since Tom comes from Lunenburg he knows how to row a boat.
The word "since" marks the link between antecedent and conse-
quent, indicating whatever it is that distinguishes (8) from
(9) Tom comes from Lunenburg and he knows how to row a boat.
(4) Another example: I f  Nelson got to town today, there'll be beer in the fridge; so if
there's no beer in the fridge, Nelson can't have got to town.
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It is "since" , Goodman remarks, that "shows that what is in
question is a certain kind of connection between the two component
sentences; and the truth o f  statements o f this kind — whether they
have the form of counterfactual or factual conditionals or some other
form — depends not upon the truth or falsity of the components but
upon whether the intended connection obtains" (p. 5). The same
would apply to the word "because", which could also be used to
distinguish (8) from (9).
Now for semantics. The problem is to provide, for statements like
(7) and (8), truth-conditions which are sensitive to the presence of a
connection and do not automatically assign the value " true"  to any
conditional with true antecedent and consequent. The Stalnaker-Le-
wis semantics, of course, do assign A El— qi• the value " true"  whene-
ver A and B are true, for in that case the closest A-world is the actual
world, and the actual world is a B-world. These semantics verify
conditionals like:
(10) I f  Hitler is dead then Mazzini u n i l
-
ie d  I t a l y . (
s
)
Semantics for factual conditionals A 111—q3 which catch the idea of
connection must require that not only the actual world (which might
after a ll constitute an atypical case) but also many neighboring
branches be A &B-worlds. As in  the case o f  counterfactuals, the
crucial question concerns the presence of falsifying A & —B-worlds. If
A 0-3B is to be true is virtue of a connection between A and B. how
close should such worlds be? Since the actual world is A &B. it would
seem unwise to  permit A  El—>B to  be true given that the closest
—B-worlds were A-worlds, for in that case it might be only a happy
accident that the actual world was A &B rather than A &  B .  The
alternative is  that the closest —B-worlds should be  —A-worlds,
yielding the following:
A
Closest A  & —
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As an illustration consider the following variant of Goodman's factual
conditional :
(11) Since the butter was heated to 1 5 0
°
F,  i t  m e l t e d .Our truth-conditions require that the closest branches on which thebutter does not melt are branches on which it is not heated to 1 5 0
°
F.
This requirement accomplishes what is wanted, namely to characte-
rize branches on which the butter is heated to 1 5 0
°
F a n d  d o e s  n o t
melt — branches which falsify (11) — as more remote from the actual
world than branches on which the butter is neither heated nor melts.
This is not to say that there are no branches at all on which the butter
is heated to 150PF and fails to melt: branches on which the butter is
treated with, a hardening substance which raises its melting point
would be examples. But i f  (11) is to be true, these branches must
diverge from the actual world at an earlier time than branches on
which the butter is neither heated nor melts. For a factual conditional
A 1=1—q3 to be true, some —A & —B-worlds must be closer than any
A & —B-worlds.
Exactly the same considerations apply to subjunctive conditionals
and to indicative conditionals in the present or future tense:
(12) I f  the track were to be muddy, Sunny Dancer would win.
(13) I f  the track is muddy, Sunny Dancer will win.
For (12) and (13) to be true, what is needed ? Presumably what faces
us is an array of possible outcomes of four different types : (i) the track
is muddy and Sunny wins, (ii) the track is not muddy and Sunny wins,
(iii) the track is not muddy and Sunny loses, (iv) the track is muddy
and Sunny loses. I f  (12) and (13) are true, then type (iv) outcomes
must lie outside a cone of solid type (i) - (iii) outcomes. Furthermore,
we must already have passed the point beyond which no type (iv)
worlds are accessible. (
6
) T h e y  
c a n  
f o r m  
t h e  
s h e l
l  




e ,  
b





Now the actual world (consistent with t
h e  t r u t h  o f  
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muddy track and drops dead of a coronary thrombosis? Perhaps we could allow a few
freakish type (iv) worlds within the cone, but so few that their measure relative to the
type (i) - (iii) worlds would be zero or almost zero.
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be either type (i) or type (ii) or type (iii), it doesn't matter which. Once
the race is over, certain factual conditionals will become true, e.g.
"Since the track was muddy, Sunny won", or "Since Sunny lost, the
track can't have been muddy". Now for these conditionals to be true,
as we saw earlier, the worlds which satisfy their antecedents and
consequents cannot be "next"  to falsifying type (iv) worlds, but must
always be isolated from them by other closer type (i) or (iii) worlds.
The interior of the cone of verifying worlds, therefore, must form an
open set, with every type (i) world being separated from the surface of
the cone b y a  type (ii i) world and vice versa. I f  is upon such
topological features of the branched structure of possible worlds that
the truth conditions for connexive conditionals depend. (
7
)
So far we have discussed counterfactual conditionals (false antece-
dent and consequent) and factual conditionals (true antecedent and
consequent), but we have not yet considered what Goodman calls
"semifactuals" (false antecedent and true consequent). The examples
of this kind that Goodman introduces are all "even if "  conditionals:
(14) Even if  the match had been scratched, it still would not have
lighted.
Conditionals in  which the consequent is true irrespective o f  the
truth of the antecedent can always be stated, and are perhaps always
best stated, in "even if ' fo rm:
(15) Even i f  the US renounces the use o f  nuclear weapons, the
earth will be struck by a comet in 1997.
For Goodman, semifactuals have the force o f  denying what is
affirmed by c o u n t e
r
f a c t u a l s ;  
t h u s  
( 1 4 )  
h a s  
t h e  
f o r






(16) I f  the match had been scratched, it  would have lighted.
In his words, " fu ll counterfactuals affirm, while semifactuals deny,








































































the cone becomes the actual world, it will always seem to the inhabitants of that world
that they are at the cone's centre, with lots of worlds of different types separating them
from the walls. Compare in special relativity the world-line of an observer relative to the
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quent" (p . 6). Stalnaker, on the other hand, regards Goodman's
relegation o f  "even i f "  conditionals to  a  different category f rom
counterfactuals as an " a d  hoc manoeuvre", designed to  save the
analysis by paraphrasing the counterexamples(s), and treats it  as a
virtue of his own semantics that they can deal with counterfactuals
and "even if "  conditionals in the same way.
The approach adopted here will be somewhat different. I f  we look
closely at the category of semifactuals, we see that they fall into two
distinct types. First there are "even if"  conditionals, the consequents
of which are true regardless of the truth of their antecedents, and for
which no connection between antecedent and consequent exists.
Secondly there are semifactuals fo r which such a connection does
exist, which (roughly and broadly) cite the antecedent as an alterna-
tive way, not used in fact, o f  bringing about the consequent. Fo r
example, suppose little Sophie has a fever which is brought down with
a sponge bath. The doctor may then say :
(17) I f  Sophie had been given aspirin, her fever would have gonedown.
This semifactual is true, and its truth depends on a link between
antecedent and consequent, although it is not of the "even i f  ' variety.
In what follows we shall say no more about "even if "  conditionals,
but confine the discussion to semifactuals which require that such a
connection exists. They differ from the others in  that they resist
translation into "even i f "  fo rm ; thus (17) means something quitedifferent from:
(18) Even if  Sophie had been given aspirin, her fever would have
gone done,
or for that matter from:
(19) I f  Sophie had been given aspirin, her fever would still have
gone down.
Truth-conditions for semifactuals are determined in the same way
as those for "since" conditionals. What would falsify the conditional
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"Since A, B "  is an A & —B-world, hence the truth of the conditional
requires that the closest —B-worlds be —A-worlds. (The actual world
is A  &B, hence i t  is  trivia lly true that the closest A-worlds are
B-worlds). Similarly in the case of semifactuals, worlds which falsify
(17) are worlds in which Sophie is given aspirin and her fever does
not go down. Hence (17)'s truth requires both that in  the closest
worlds in which Sophie is given aspirin her fever goes down, and also
that in the closest worlds in which Sophie's fever does not go down,
she is not given aspirin. A D—>B is a true semifactual, therefore, i f
some A &B-worlds and some —A & —B-worlds are closer than any
A & —B-world.
It is worthwhile mentioning at this point that while the truth of (17)
may in some complicated way rest upon the truth of a general causal
law relating the administration of aspirin to fever abatement, or (more
plausibly) upon other more fundamental laws of which the aspirin-fe-
ver abatement linkage is a consequence, (17) itself is not an instance of
a general law, nor are any o f  the other conditionals whose truth-
conditions we have been considering. Although it may well be that
giving Sophie aspirin will bring down her fever in this case, giving
other people aspirin may not bring down their fevers, nor may giving
Sophie aspirin on another occasion if  her illness is more severe. The
A's, B 's  and C s  which occur in  o u r truth-conditions relate to
particular historical events, even i f  our branched model structures
allow the same historical event t o  occur on different branches.
Although the antecedent o f  (17) can be regarded as asserting the
instantiation o f  the event-type "Sophie being given aspirin" on a
particular occasion, and the consequent the instantiation o f  the
event-type "Sophie's fever coming down", and although (17) if  true
asserts a connection between these two instantiations on this occa-
sion, (17) does not assert that the two  event-types will always be
instantiated together, or even that they will be co-instantiated the next
time. The beauty of the truth conditions furnished for conditionals by
possible-world semantics is that they are sensitive to context, allo-
wing a given conditional to be true when uttered on one occasion and
false when uttered on the next.
Before concluding, one more question remains to be discussed, that
of contraposition. Up to now there has been rough agreement among
logicians that counterfactuals do not contrapose, that we cannot argue
IF, SINCE AND BECAUSE 3 1 9
in all cases from A 0—* B to —B 1:1—* —A.(
9
) C e r t a i n l y  t h i s  
i s  t r u e  
i n  
t h e
case of "even i f '  conditionals. As Goodman notes, we cannot argue
as follows:
(20) Even if  the match had been scratched, it still would not have
lighted. Therefore, even i f  the match lighted, it  st ill wasn't
scratched.
But in cases where there exists a connection between antecedent
and consequent, contraposition holds:
(21) I f  Steve had known he was going to Vancouver, he would have
packed his bag last night. Therefore, since Steve didn't pack
his bag, he couldn't have know he was going. (
1 0 )It is true that in the example just given the original conditional is a
forward counterfactual, while the contrapositive is a backward fac-
tual. Plainly one counterfactual cannot be the contrapositive o f
another. But if the proper constraints are observed, it will be seen that
conditionals which are based on a connection between antecedent and
consequent a ll do contrapose, the result being a conditional o f  a
different type which still preserves the vital connection. Thus the
contrapositive of a forward counterfactual is a backward factual, that
of a forward factual is a backward counterfactual, that o f  a forward
semifactual is a backward semifactual, and that of a forward subjunc-
tive or indicative conditional is a backward subjunctive or indicative
conditional. Furthermore, all these forms preserve their truth-values
under contraposition according to the truth-conditions given for them
above.
Take as an example the case o f  forward and backward semlfac-
tuals:
(17) I f  Sophie had been given aspirin, her fever would have gone
down.













































































































































Like Socrates we must be ready, our bags packed, to go wherever the argument leads
us.
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Representing (17) as Al=1—B, its truth-conditions require that some
A &B-worlds and some —A & —B-worlds a re  closer than any
A & —B-world. But these are precisely the conditions required for the
truth o f  the backward semlfactual (22) —B H e n c e ,  under
these semantics, contraposition holds.
McGill University S t o r r s  MCCALL
Summary
Conditionals like " I f  Sophie is given aspirin, her fever goes down"
seem to depend for their truth upon a connection between antecedent
and consequent, while others, such as " I f  the US does not renounce
the use of nuclear weapons, the earth will be struck by a comet in
1997", do not. Using a branched courses-of-events version of possible
world semantics, truth-conditions are provided which verify conditio-
nals that reflect such a connection and which falsify those that do not.
These truth-conditions apply to counterfactuals (false antecedent and
consequent), factuals (true antecedent and consequent), and semi-
factuals (false antecedent and true consequent), as well as to subjunc-
tive and indicative conditionals in general. I f  the required connection
between antecedent and consequent is present, it is shown that we can
in all cases argue from " I f  A then B"  to " I f  not B. then not A" .
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